Is Philosophy Science?
I’ll just post some impressions of tonight’s seminar. I’ll not mention Chris Hughes since he was being too reasonable to warrant comment.
Wilfried made some beautiful statements that I found myself agreeing with. There is no know how/ know that distinction, if knowledge doesn’t have an application then it fails to be right or wrong and there is no criteria for truth. There is no criteria for correctness in philosophy so philosophy is like singing.
But I wasn’t convinced that this made philosophy any different from science. Wilfried also said that in science you stand on the shoulders of giants, whereas in philosophy you bring the giants to their knees. There is a one to one relationship between philosophers and theories. Science created his pen and was the fact that his TV didn’t work. I doubt that the TV repair man is anymore of a scientist than a philosopher, nor that the beautiful fountain pen relied on any scientific principles that weren’t around in Archimedes time.
David Papineau made a couple of interesting outrageous comments: That philosophy did not involve conceptual analysis and that philosophy was unlike science when it concerned itself with modality, but that modality was only peripheral to philosophy anyway.
Of course in a room full of philosophers there was a lot of singing going on about what philosophy was, and a lot of agreement in this regard. But there was no clear idea of what science was.
Science is exclusively modal (I polemically claim) Science tells us what is possible, what is necessary and what is impossible. Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade. A modal claim. It is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light. A modal claim. Scientific laws extend to counterfactual cases, so any statement of scientific law is a statement about what might be, what can be, what can’t be and what couldn’t have been.
Science is not directly practical. Very little technology is developed by scientists. It is true that a good bridge builder, or pen manufacturer will use principles that have been worked out at some point by scientists. But they will also use aesthetic principles and operate within a political environment that has been shaped by ideas of a softer kind. The pen that Wilfried Ostended was as much a product of Bentham and Marx as it was of any science. Einstein, the archetypal scientist, was not a scientist because of Hiroshoma, he wasn’t even a scientist because of the motion of Mercury. If his theory had been proven false he may not have been so famous, but he would still have been doing science. Science without application is not thereby philosophy and philosophy with application is not thereby science.
Wilfried made some beautiful statements that I found myself agreeing with. There is no know how/ know that distinction, if knowledge doesn’t have an application then it fails to be right or wrong and there is no criteria for truth. There is no criteria for correctness in philosophy so philosophy is like singing.
But I wasn’t convinced that this made philosophy any different from science. Wilfried also said that in science you stand on the shoulders of giants, whereas in philosophy you bring the giants to their knees. There is a one to one relationship between philosophers and theories. Science created his pen and was the fact that his TV didn’t work. I doubt that the TV repair man is anymore of a scientist than a philosopher, nor that the beautiful fountain pen relied on any scientific principles that weren’t around in Archimedes time.
David Papineau made a couple of interesting outrageous comments: That philosophy did not involve conceptual analysis and that philosophy was unlike science when it concerned itself with modality, but that modality was only peripheral to philosophy anyway.
Of course in a room full of philosophers there was a lot of singing going on about what philosophy was, and a lot of agreement in this regard. But there was no clear idea of what science was.
Science is exclusively modal (I polemically claim) Science tells us what is possible, what is necessary and what is impossible. Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade. A modal claim. It is impossible to travel faster than the speed of light. A modal claim. Scientific laws extend to counterfactual cases, so any statement of scientific law is a statement about what might be, what can be, what can’t be and what couldn’t have been.
Science is not directly practical. Very little technology is developed by scientists. It is true that a good bridge builder, or pen manufacturer will use principles that have been worked out at some point by scientists. But they will also use aesthetic principles and operate within a political environment that has been shaped by ideas of a softer kind. The pen that Wilfried Ostended was as much a product of Bentham and Marx as it was of any science. Einstein, the archetypal scientist, was not a scientist because of Hiroshoma, he wasn’t even a scientist because of the motion of Mercury. If his theory had been proven false he may not have been so famous, but he would still have been doing science. Science without application is not thereby philosophy and philosophy with application is not thereby science.
Labels: Chris Hughes, David Papineau, Philosophy, science, Wilfried Meyer-Viol
posted by bloggin the Question at 8:55 PM
18 Comments:
Is Philosophy a Science?
I would argue no for the following reasons:
1) Science (to make a crude generalization) proceeds via two steps: (i) abstraction and (ii) idealization.
The scientist (so the orthodox believe) observe empirical phenomena and abstract (what they believe to be) the salient qualities/properties, and then idealize them into a conceptual/theoretical framework with which to describe, explain and predict phenomena.
The degree of creativity will vary depending on the nature of the scientific inquiry.
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Now, consider the noble philosopher:
The problem is that the philosopher, strictly, speaking, is a commentator: we don't go out there and try to explain or predict anything, in the same way a scientist do.
Instead, the philosopher attempts to elucidate and clarify.
Essentially, there are two types of philosophy:
1) "The Philosophy of ____",
and
2) "Philosophy".
Re. #2, "philosophy" is concerned with 'meta-questions': what is truth? What is right? what is wrong? blablabla.
This is certainly NOT a science, in my view, as these 'meta-questions' refer to nothing:
Surely it's no coincidence that philosophers have been posing and debating these same questions on and off for the best part of 2,500 years?
Philosophers have an annoying tendency of posing problems and offering no resolutions. This is because they have no answer, no solution.
I repeat again, "philosophy" [#2] is NOT a science.
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However, what about #2: "The Philosophy of ____" ?,
where '_____' is anything, e.g. the 'philosophy of physics', 'the philosophy of mathematics', 'philosophy of language', etc.
I would argue that such branches of philosophy are as much a science as the '___' is.
Why?
Well, the answer is simple:
Such "Philosophies of x" are concerned with a specific subject matter, viz., 'x'. The philosophical inquiry therefore constrained by 'x' itself.
E.g. Consider the 'Philosophy of Physics'.
Physics Is a science.
So what does the philosopher of physics do?
He examines the concepts of physics, the theories of physics, and the methods of physicists.
Such a philosopher is therefore engaging in conceptual analysis and should also be well-versed with the theories in question, and know a sufficient amount of mathematics and science in order to do this effectively).
R.
mmm, I see your point 'R'.
Pure traditional "Philosophy", as you put it, doesn't really refer to anything. The questions posed by classical traditional "Alain de Botton" or "A.C.Grayling" philosophy doesn't really refer to anything. it's just idle speculation, with no real answers,as the questions posed are indeed too vague to have any practical determinate truth values.
It reminds me of an old quip about historians:
"History repeats itself, and historians repeat one another".
I think the same can be applied to philosophy and philosophers:
"Philosophy repeats itself, and philosophers repeat one another".
i.e. yes, lots of new 'isms' emerge, but they're really just ever-increasing sophisticated elaborations of the same philosophical positions.
"Philosophy",as you put it, isn't a science at all.
But "the Philosophy of x" [#1], can be construed as a science insofar as the 'x' in question is a science.
If the scientific method is applied to 'x', e.g. the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of science in general, this is a science, as it employs the scientific method.
But what about things like the philosophy of psychology or the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mathematics?
This all depends on whether you regard psychology, linguistics or mathematics as a science i suppose.
IF you do regard them as sciences, then I agree that "The philosophy of Language/psychology and mathematics" are indeed sciences as well.
P.
Flying in the face of Wilfied I'll build on what R has said. I agree that Science attempts through abstraction and idealization to describe, explain and predict phenomena.
I would argue though that this is just what philosophy does. Philosophy also idealises and abstracts explanation, description and prediction themselves. Hempel is an example of one who has abstracted and idealised explanation in such a way that it describes predicts and explains explanation. The prediction is that anything that has certain properties will count as an explanation. Thus Hempel's theory or explanation is falsifiable from the armchair, since we do not have to dig ditches to examine explanations.
The Philosophy of Science is no more science that the history of mathematics is mathematics, or the sociology of religion is religion.
The difference between Science and Philosophy seems to be that Science treats empirical data. In order to do science there must already be agreement about the use of instruments, the units of measurement and the meaning of theoretical terms. The great physicists did very little observation and spent most of their effort theorising. This is because a single well observed counterexample is enough to falsify a robust theory. Repeating observations generally adds very little, as long as they are repeatable. This is very similar to the Gettier counterexample to S knows that p iff S has a true justified belief that P. Once one counterexample has been uncovered it is clear that they can be generated easily. Neither philosopher nor scientist would waste time creating Gettier style true justified beliefs and observing that they are not knowledge. The "observation" can be done off line and is not strengthened by repetition.
Philosophy and science resemble each other in that they both are interested in timeless truths. The softer sciences and the arts in contrast are interested in contingent truths.
Just to reply to Jonny's point about modality.
'Necessarily, water is HOH' (A) is a modal claim.
'Water is HOH' (B) is not a modal claim.
True, if (B) is true, then (A) is true too.
But you can be interested in (B) without being interested in (A) per se.
That's how I think it is with philosophy. Most of the time we're interested in claim like (B), which as it happens will be necessary if true. But in the first instance we're interested in their truth, not their necessity.
Interesting points.
I disagree with Jonny though:
You stated that a physical theory can be refuted by a single counter example.
"The great physicists did very little observation and spent most of their effort theorising. This is because a single well observed counterexample is enough to falsify a robust theory.".
This is not necessarily so, as anyone acquainted with the 'Duhem-Quine Hypothesis': A given physical theory can be 'saved' so long as one is willing to sufficiently modify the auxiliary hypothesis.
E.g. The abnormal movement of Uranus in the nineteenth century was initially considered inconsistent with Newton's new theory. By taking a hard-line of falsifiability, as Jonny puts it, Newtonian theory should have been chucked out.
However, by claiming the existence of an unseen seventh planet, the anomaly was explained within Newton's paradigm. And later on Neptune was discovered.
Accepting or rejecting one given scientific theory over another is far more complex than your analogy with the Gettier example.
According to the Duhem-Quine hypothesis, one may 'save' a given theory from recalcitrant data.
And what about mutually compatible physical theories which can explain the phenomena adequately well? Which one to choose?
These situations are not machinations of the idle philosopher, as they happen, and continue to happen.
The Gettier example is not analogous to science: it is analogous to mathematics, where one counterexample is enough.
But in science this is certainly not the case: it may be anomalous result, and must be checked again and again.
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Jonny then writes that:
"The Philosophy of Science is no more science that the history of mathematics is mathematics, or the sociology of religion is religion."
Of course this is correct: history is not a science, so neither is the history of mathematics. And sociology [in my opinion] is not a science either, ipso facto, neither is the sociology of religion.
Science is about methods. The methods of the historian, although admirable, are utterly different from those of the mathematician. And likewise, the methods of the sociologists are nothing whatsoever akin to those of religion [if religion can be deemed to have a 'method' at all, of course].
But "Philosophy of physics" or "philosophy of language" can be deemed sciences insofar as physics and linguistics can be deemed a science.
R.
R, I appreciate your upping the level into a decent discussion of the Philosophy of science. But I concede rather than take the challenge. I meant only that a single experiment, if well designed, *can* decide between two competing theories. I agree, as you point out, that often a theory will persist inspite of counter evidence through the mechanism of auxilary hypotheses etc.
But the parallel is there with the Gettier counterexamples. Many articles were written trying to give auxilary hypotheses, and further Gettier counterexamples were produced.
To answer David's comment, I admit to not really understanding why you made an exception of modality. Of course it is trivial that scientific statements are going to be either contingent or necessary since this exhausts the possibilities. But surely scientific theories do more than this. They make commitments of a modal nature. They tell us what is necessary and what is contingent.
For example I have heard it said that although it is true that life on earth is carbon based, this is contingent, and it is in fact possible that life could have been silicon based. Is this philosophical? Or scientific?
Interesting issue Jonny [re.the modal elaboration of David's comment].
Modality seems to be something exclusively philosophical:
You don't hear a physicist saying "Yes, well, I've formulated an alternative periodic table. Admittedly none of these elements exist, but in another possible world they could!".
Philosophy is always at the meta-level: a philosopher of physics is concerned, not only with the theories advanced by physicists, but also with the normative aspects: what makes a scientific theory? What gives epistemic warrant in believing in quarks, muons, gluons and leptons?
Higher level physics, e.g. cosmologists, do tend to deal with the meta-level: e.g. the conditions for the big bang, how the university could have been otherwise.
These modal questions are essentially philosophical.
Perhaps we're the only ones who think these questions are worthy of investigation.
But they're our questions and belong to philosophy.
R.
I guess I'm a bit of a radical about modality. Dorothy Edgington said in an article that I accept that there are only two types of possibility, epistemic possibility and natural possibility. Could the periodic table have been different? If we look back to the past we can answer "Yes" to this question epistemically, but not naturally. Now it is not even epistemically possible that the periodic table is different, and we know this through science. Is there another form of modality under which the periodic table is contingent? I suppose everyone thinks there is. I can only think this is a kind of conniving fictional possibility.
Here is a definition for sameness of species of bird: Two birds are of the same species if they can interbreed. This is a scientific fact that may be analytic. For any two birds we can discover if they are of the same species given that one is female and the other male. But if we don't do this test, they are still of the same species. As long as the possibility of them interbreeding is there. The definition is essentially modal.
Evolutionary theorists sometimes construct models of worlds to see alternative biospheres evolving. In these models they can adjust various parameters and "see" what kind of creatures will survive under various evolutionary pressures. Is this Philosophy? Mathematics? Science? A new form of fiction?
Given a few plausible advances in genetics it may be possible to create computer models of possible human beings. A gene combination might be known to result in a blond, green eyed, argumentive girl with a predisposition to dance. A girl who does not exist. Such a computer generated model is a piece of technology that is within our grasp. Would it be science? Or philosophy? Or Mathematics? Would the girl exist? Would the possibility of the girl exist? Would she have counterparts in other possible worlds but not in this one? Would she have an unrequited right to exist?
R is right, these are our questions, and they are upon us.
Interesting idea.
Your line of reasoning reminds me of Bradley's [or at least, i think it's Bradley's], when he wrote of necessity.
In a [paraphrased] nutshell:
When we look at science, and all the laws of nature from disparate diverse areas of inquiry, chemistry, physics, etc, they all seem, prime facie, to be merely contingent, and both the philosopher and the practicing scientist may reply that they could have equally well been otherwise.
However, once one takes a wider holistic look at this diverse laws and truths, one sees that each builds upon the foundation of the other, an interlocking network of truths, laws and facts.
Each one becomes necessary for the other facts to follow.
In short, we see a network of natural necessity emerging.
Take hypothetical necessity: A is true because B is true.
A is prima facie contingent: it could have been otherwise. But because B occurred, this makes A necessary, or to be more accurate: A is hypothetically necessary, on the hypothesis that B occurs.
We look closer and see that B is likewise hypothetically necessary on the subsumption that C occurs, and so on.
What gives things necessity then? On such a naive regress we, like the cosmologists, arrive at the big bang: the initial conditions of the universe have given rise to the properties congenial for life to have emerged 15 billion years later.
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I think the question posed by Jonny relating to evolutionary theory is indeed a fascinating one. Evolutionary Theorists frequently use computer simulations of species to observe hypothetical evolution in species.
Is this fiction?
Of course it is.
So why do they do it?
Is it, as Jonny put it, a new branch of fiction?
I think not.
It's a heuristic [though admittedly somewhat fanciful] tool to aid them to gain a greater insight into REAL evolution.
By seeing how things could have been, we gain a greater insight [one would hope] into the way things are.
Modality, in this sense, IS part of the scientific agenda, and the evolutionary theorists are legitimated in applying it.
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So what is the difference between the philosopher employing modal arguments and those of the evolutionary biologist, or indeed, of the cosmologists investigating the way the universe is now with how different values for constants and initial conditions in the big bang to create slight perturbations in these values?
Well, the evolutionary biologists and the cosmologists attempt to gain greater insight into the way the world IS.
But the philosopher, being a "meta-theorist" of sorts, is concerned with something far deeper: what such modal statements even mean!
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I think this is why scientists hate us, as where their questioning terminates in the 'real' world, fully satisfied with the light it's shed on their subject matter, we, the philosophers, push further...asking what their answers mean.
But as long as they keep asking the questions, we can always retort with the two most powerful words in the English Language the philosopher has at his or her disposal:
"How" and "why".
In short: We give them a headache.
(;-)
R.
Very elucidating reply 'R're. Jonny's disanalogy between 'History of Mathematics' and 'sociology of Religion' compared to the Philosophy of Mathematics.
Reminds me of an old quip I heard:
The Philosophy of Economics is rich.
The Economics of Philosophy is poor.
P.
Infact, I suppose a potential problem could be raised against Philosophy [either "Philosophy" or "The Philosophy of X"] as follows:
According to Kuhn, psychology is not a science because it has no coherent paradigm. I.e. there are lots of different methods employed in treating and explaining psychological disorders, ranging from cognitive therapy, behavioural therapy, psychoanalsysis, etc.
And the same, to a degree, applies to Philosophy.
Philosophical methods range from conceptual analysis [the 'linguistic turn'], the analytic tradition, and so on. And then there's 'Continental Philosophy' of course.
Furthermore, there's also the fact that philosophers rarely agree on the terms involved: Philosophy saturated with "isms", which are constantly shifting and evolving.
In sciences on the other hand, there may be disagreement with interpretations of the results, but they all, by and large, accept the empirical method.
If the philosophers quibble constantly about the use of terms and even the meaning of the terms involved, then it certainly has no coherent paradigm and is therefore nothing like a science at all!
But then again, isn't this simply the definition of philosophy?
It's our job to poke our noses into everyone else's business and ask these annoying 'meta-questions' repeatedly.
Philosophy is the only discipline that is absolutely and inscrutably self-reflective.
R.
I liked your comments about Bradley, R. Since I was an undergraduate I've been making this mistake, the modal fallacy. Necessarily if p then p, p therefore necessarily p. All truths are necessary truths. That sums up my thoughts on metaphysical necessity. The interesting modal questions are all epistemic. Natural necessity is just what is epistemically possible given that we know the true laws of nature.
Take this question: Is it possible for a human being to be twice as intelligent as Einstein? This question is interesting and modal. But the interesting answer is not metaphysical. What is interesting is that we do not know whether this is possible or not. Perhaps there is some natural limit to intelligence. Perhaps our concept of intelligence is not well defined enough for this to be answerable. Perhaps the modifications necessary for super intelligence would make the resultant subject non human. Whether scientists or philosophers use their methods to answer the question, the question is the same, it is about the same fact: whether it is possible for a human to be twice as intelligent as Einstein. Suppose for example it turned out that the number of dopamine receptors needed to double for each 50% increase in intelligence. Then it would be impossible to double intelligence. A philosopher may turn around and say that this is a contingent matter that dopamine receptors are related to intelligence in just this way. What would this mean? That it is only contingently impossible to double Einsteins intelligence? Such a philoosopher would only really being saying that he doesn't really understand the point, and can therefore easily imagine it otherwise. I can imagine that pigs can fly, but this is because I have only a loose grasp of aerodynamics. Is it metaphysically possible for pigs to fly? No.
On the other point much as I agree with and approve of R's sentiments, I wonder if R is making the same mistake as Wilfried in confusing solutions to practical problems with Science. There are disperate methods of treating psychological problems, but this does not mean that psychology is not a science. There are disperate methods of solving physical problems, this does not mean that physics does not have a paradigm. EG. Transporting goods is a problem. Solutions could involve Jet propelled aeroplanes, nuclear submarines, pack horses, conveyor belts, hydro powered cable cars, ships. All these different solutions will involve different disciplines, different techniques. This does not mean that physics is not a science. But the problem is essential a physical problem. What could be more physical that moving a physical object from one region of space to another within a limited time frame? So why should the fact that there are various solutions to problems like unhappiness, nervousness and anorexia mean that there is no psychological paradigm?
Mmm,
Interesting thought Jonny, but I think the transport/psychology analogy is illegitimate for the following reason:
In the case of transportation, although the methods of transporting goods/objects from one region of space to another may be different, we all agree on what needs to be done, viz., the fact the objects need to moved as efficiently and cost effectively as possible. The method deployed, be it train,aeroplane, ship, horse-drawn carriage of an army of carrier pigeons, is simply a means to an end. But each method is chosen based on the same principles: cost effectiveness and efficiency.
However, the psychology case is radically different: the psychologists all agree that the patient needs to get better. But the different paradigms of psychology will disagree on what the cause of the symptoms are and, ipso facto, what the best solution is.
E.g. Consider a patient who has a phobia if bananas.
The Behavioural psychologist will assume that the patient has inadvertently associated bananas with something negative.
Perhaps the patient [let's call him 'Peter']had a father who was a banana importer. When Peter was a child his fathers import banana ship went missing off the coast and sunk without a trace. So little Peter now associates grief and loss with bananas.
As such, the method of treatment will be to form a new association of bananas with something positive, and this will be carried out via the formation of new positive psychological associations. E.g. perhaps Peter will be put in a lab and a card showing a happy faced person will appear alongside a banana.
The treatment will be simple: stimulus-response: Pavlovian conditioning.
For the Behaviourist there is nothing deeper that needs to be addressed in therapy.
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However, consider the Cognitive therapists position: He may likewise identify the banana importing fathers ship disappearance with the banana phobia, but instead of simple stimulus-response Pavlovian-style conditioning, will opt for cognitive therapy. The patient will be taught to change his thought-patterns to break the irrational psychological association.
Cognitive therapy acknowledges a deeper solution than simply behavioural modification: For the cognitive therapist it is not simply behaviour, it is also the cognitive processes that are the causes, and so these must likewise be treated.
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Now, consider the Freudian Psychoanalyst: I don't think we need to elaborate what the Freudian would interpret the banana as symbolizing.... (;-)
So, the Freudian Psychoanalyst would attempt to treat Peter by a long [and most likely, highly overpriced] session of psychoanalysis.
........................
What's the moral of this [admittedly somewhat overly long and convoluted] story here...?
As Psychology lacks a coherent paradigm, the same problem, [viz., poor Peter suffering from an acute phobia of bananas], will have different causes identified, and different methods of treatment to solve the problem will be advocated.
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Jonny's highly interesting comparison of physical transportation is interesting, but not at all legitimate an analogy, as transportation is merely a logistical problem: the choice of which transportation method to employ is simply whichever one is most cost effective and efficient., viz., whichever method is quickest, cheapest and [perhaps] least damaging to the environment.
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In the case of physics itself, the methodology is already fixed: the empirical method.
Hypotheses are formulated in the light of experimental data; these theories are tested; and if they fit the data, make successful empirical predictions, and explain the phenomena, then they pass the test and go on to stand as potentially viable candidates as "the" accepted theory to explain the phenomena in question.
.............................
The "Philosophy of Physics", then, would take upon itself the task of meticulously scrutinizing these theories, the concepts involved in them, what these concepts entail, what physical significance the equations had, what the meaning of such hypotheses had [if any such meaning could be assigned to them, of course], and so on.
E.g. Philosophers of physics tend to be concerned with the following areas: 1) General and Special Relativity, and 2) Quantum Mechanics [and of course the more general issues to do with scientific methodology and theory choice; but these issues tend to fall under the mandate of 'Philosophers of Science' in general].
A Philosopher of Physics will ask such questions as:
"What does it mean to say that events in spacetime are relative to one another?".
"What does it mean to say that it is impossible for a physicist to empirically measure both the momentum and velocity of a subatomic particle according to Heisenberg's 'Uncertainty Principle?".
"What does it mean for two [or more] given events in spacetime to be simultaneous in one reference frame but not so in another?"
And so on.
These questions, as I stated before, are "meta-questions": they rise above the questions the physicists pose.
These are indeed philosophical questions, but they are framed within a scientific framework, and are both informed and constrained by science.
So, 'philosophy of physics' Is a science, whereas 'philosophy of psychology' is,...perhaps,...not.
Nota Bene`. I am not for a moment claiming that I believe psychology is not a science: I am merely putting forward a viewpoint that has been advanced by others.
R.
P.s. Jonny: I think the modal fallacy of Bradley actually goes back to Kant.
His famous dictum: "He who wills the End must also will the means to those Ends".
I.e. It is necessary to do A if you want to do B.
It is a conditional necessity, founded on the hypothesis that you wish to 'will' B to occur.
However, widening the goal posts with each step back, one must also will the means to A if one wishes A to occur in order to ensure that B occurs.
This headache-inducing iterative process of willing yet more and more means to achieve B will take us to the beginning of the Universe, and we thus arrive, slightly dizzy and exhausted, at a form of Bradley's natural necessity.
P.p.s. I don't think Dopamine receptors have anything to do with intelligence. Yes, they play a role in control of motivation, learning, and fine motor movement, as well as modulation of neuroendocrine signaling. But an increase in them can, rather than increase learning and cognitive ability [viz., 'intelligence'], are actually linked with several rather serious of neuropsychiatric disorders, such as ADHD, Drug Abuse, Schizophrenia, and extreme hypertension [genetically based].
I think that increased intelligence would be associated with an increase neo [frontal] cortex and/or an increase in neural connections in the brain.
R.
Maybe we should use the Jesuit method and only argue positions we believe to be true to save time. I take it that you agree that psychology IS science. Just to clear things up lets just forget about psychoanalysis. And let us allow also that psychology is progressing and that behaviourism is not a rival theory but a precursor of contemporary psychology.
If this is so we can ask whether the philosophy of Mind IS psychology and we have established the motion.
The study of the human mind is fraught with philosophical issues and I would say that philosophy is indispensable to a decent psychology. So philosophy is science.
You write that philosophy is indispensible to psychology.
I would go further and assert that philosophy is indispensible to all disciplines,... except perhaps business studies and accounting. (;-)
R.
Some of the people commenting here seem to use the word "psychology" to mean "psychotherapy," whereas others seem to be using it in the broader sense of "the study of behavior." This seems to be causing some confusion. I realize I am coming very late to this game...
You may find this post on the topic interesting.
coglanlab,
I'd forgotton all about this post. There is no need to distinguish psychotherapy from psychology. Psychotherapy is just narrower in scope. If someone has depression, they have, or present, a psychological problem. If waking them up early and getting them involved in their community cures them, then this is a solution to a psychological problem. Call it psychotherapy if you like, it makes no difference to the issue. Can such problems and solutions be investigated scientifically and if so, are they being investigated scientifically?
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